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FAA Systemic Failures: NTSB’s Damning Report on Washington Mid-Air Collision

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The mid-air collision in January 2025 over the Potomac River, involving an American Airlines regional jet and a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, was neither a random event nor an unforeseeable chain of human errors. According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the accident—which resulted in 67 fatalities—was the outcome of accumulated systemic failures within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and decisions that, despite having prior data and warnings, were never made.

NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy was unequivocal during a full-day public hearing this Tuesday: “100 percent of this was preventable. The data was there, in the FAA’s own systems.” Her statements set the tone for one of the harshest institutional criticisms the U.S. regulator has received in decades.

Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: A High-Complexity Operating Environment Ignored for Years

Reagan Airport is no ordinary airfield. It is the 26th busiest in the United States, operates the country’s most active runway, and shares a highly congested airspace with military, police, and government helicopter routes, in an environment frequently used by members of Congress and senior officials.

The NTSB revealed that since 2021, there have been 15,200 air proximity incidents between commercial aircraft and helicopters in the vicinity of the airport, including 85 events classified as “risk situations.” Despite this alarming statistic, the FAA implemented no structural changes to the management of mixed traffic nor comprehensively reviewed helicopter routes.

One of the most critical findings: the helicopter involved was flying a route with a maximum authorized altitude of 200 feet (61 meters), yet the collision occurred at nearly 300 feet, highlighting deficiencies in both route design and operational oversight.

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Unheeded Alerts, Rejected Recommendations, and a Tower Downgraded Without Explanation

The investigation also focused on organizational and cultural failures within the FAA. In 2018, the agency downgraded the Reagan control tower’s category, a decision for which—according to the NTSB—no technical criteria or justifying metrics were ever provided.

Furthermore, the FAA rejected incorporating “critical points” on helicopter route charts and could not produce documentation certifying the mandatory annual reviews of the Baltimore-Washington Helicopter Route Chart, leaving commercial airline pilots without clear information on potential traffic conflicts.

Homendy was even more blunt in describing the internal climate: “An entire tower tried to raise concerns again and again, only to be silenced by management.” The question she left hanging was as simple as it was disturbing: were the controllers set up to fail?

Technology Available, But Not Used: The Case of ADS-B

Another central point of the report was the absence of timely warnings. The NTSB concluded that the controller should have issued a safety alert, which could have allowed for evasive maneuvers.

Moreover, the ADS-B In and Out system, had it been fully operational and utilized, would have provided a warning to the jet pilot 59 seconds before impact and to the helicopter crew 48 seconds prior. U.S. lawmakers are already working on initiatives to make this technology mandatory, a discussion that now takes on renewed urgency.

Legal Liability and Immediate Consequences

In December, the Department of Justice formally recognized that the federal government is liable for the accident, admitting it breached its duty of care and that this omission was a direct cause of the disaster. The recognition also notes supervisory failures by both pilots, though the institutional emphasis lies on airspace management.

Following the accident, the FAA restricted helicopter operations in March, deeming their presence near the airport an “intolerable risk.” In May, it even prohibited the Army from flying helicopters around the Pentagon after an incident that forced two civilian aircraft to abort their landings.

A Local Problem or a National Symptom?

Perhaps the most troubling warning came when Homendy revealed that commercial airlines have alerted about other potential critical points, specifically mentioning the Burbank and Van Nuys area in California, airports separated by less than 10 miles with equally complex traffic flows. “The next mid-air collision will be there if no one pays attention,” she summarized.

The Potomac accident, the deadliest in the U.S. in over 20 years, leaves an uncomfortable but unavoidable conclusion: safety systems did not fail due to a lack of information, but due to a lack of action. The Trump administration’s announced restructuring of the FAA raises a key question for the sector: whether this tragedy will finally be the catalyst for profound reform or merely another episode in a long list of ignored warnings.

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